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Introduction 
This paper is about safeguarding public interests by promoting innovation in the energy 
sector. The Dutch government, by concluding climate accords at national and international 
level, has for instance committed itself to the target of 20 per cent of energy consumption in 
its area being of renewable energy by 2020. To achieve such sustainability ambitions the 
government is reliant on technological innovations in the energy sector. To give these 
technological innovations an actual chance of success, the Dutch government is initiating 
policy projects with private parties in partnerships. An example of such an initiative is the 
Salland Green Gas project. Taking the Salland Green Gas project as a basis, this papter 
illustrates that public interests can have innovation as an object and that policy tools (as 
safeguarding mechanisms) must respond to the dynamism in innovation processes. We go on 
to present an ex-ante analysis framework to be used for the selection of legitimate forms of 
PPP. The analysis framework is presented as a phased plan in which an attempt is made to 
find a balance between the legal-administrative values of effectiveness and legitimacy. 
 
 
Changing governance structures in the energy sector through a dynamic of public interests 
There have been many developments in the energy sector in recent decades. One of the most 
striking changes is the splitting of the integrated energy companies, with the separation of the 
network activities from the production and supply activities. These activities have then been 
placed in newly established organisations, which have been coordinated differently
ii
. Firstly, 
network companies have been set up. These companies are responsible for the network 
activities and are regulated hierarchically within the circle of government (Kist et al, 2008). 
Secondly, production and supply companies have been set up. The activities of these 
organisations have actually been placed at a distance from the government, which means that 
the operation of the production and supply companies takes place in the „free market‟iii. 
 
The concept of public interest is important to understanding the energy sector reforms. In its 
report “The safeguarding of public interest” the Dutch Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (WRR) makes a distinction between three types of interest, that is: (i) individual, (ii) 
social and (iii) public interests (2000: 19)
iv
. This categorisation furthers the conceptual 
definition of public interest. First of all, the WRR defines social interests as interests in which 
protection for society as a whole is desirable (2000: 20). The WRR then gives substance to the 
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concept of public interest by stating that a social interest becomes a public interest if the 
government is concerned about the protection of a social interest on the basis of the 
conviction that this interest will not otherwise be done full justice (2000: 20)
v
.  
 
The energy sector reforms are the result of political stands on public interests. A number of 
parties have an important position in this debate. First of all, the European Commission is 
important: it can actually be regarded as the great protagonist of the liberalisation wave in the 
energy sector. The Commission puts the interests of a properly functioning internal common 
energy market and consumer protection at the forefront in the policy choices underlying the 
European liberalisation directives (Kist et al, 2008: 13). In this market the consumer has 
freedom of choice. As a result the consumer is not dependent on just one provider (a 
monopolist) for energy. This means that the buyer of energy can make a comparison between 
different producers and suppliers and can then select the provider that (best) meets its energy 
demand. The idea is that as a result of this confrontation of supply and demand the price 
mechanism steers buyer and producer towards an optimum transaction.  
Despite the European impetus in the liberalisation of utility sectors, the degree of 
liberalisation and the approach to it differ from one member state to another (Wilkeshuis 
2010: 35). Implementation in fact counts among the powers of the member states (see 
Wilkeshuis 2010), which is where the positions of national authorities, such as the Minister of 
Economic Affairs and the Dutch parliament in the Netherlands, come into the picture. 
Initially, the thinking of the Dutch Minister was that a properly functioning internal common 
energy market, with associated consumer protection, could be achieved by positioning the 
integrated energy companies in the market as a whole, in short for production, distribution 
and network management together. According to the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, the 
realisation of this thinking would require a privatisation drive of the integrated energy 
companies after the liberalisation wave. This proposal however was resisted by the Dutch 
parliament. In the political debate the parliamentarians did not just attach importance to the 
public interests mentioned above. They raised the fact that security of supply and distribution 
network quality also had to be safeguarded. This was because the members of parliament 
feared that these interests would come under pressure if the activities of the integrated energy 
companies were to be placed entirely remote from the government. The outcome of the 
political debate is that the public interests mentioned above are safeguarded by separating the 
energy networks economically and legally from the production and supply of energy
vi
. 
 
Simultaneously with the liberalisation of the energy sector and the resulting splitting of 
integrated energy companies, the theme of climate change has moved higher up the political 
agenda. In recent decades society has made an increasingly emphatic appeal to the 
government to combat changes in the climate. This social interest has been picked up by the 
government and therefore become a public interest. The “New energy for the climate” work 
programme expresses this transformation. The report illustrates that the government is 
accepting its responsibility in the field of climate change. The document sets out how the 
Netherlands will have one of the most efficient and clean energy supplies in the European 
Union by 2020 (VROM 2007: 3). To achieve this ambition, central government has concluded 
administrative accords
vii
 on climate and energy with local authorities. Agreements have also 
been made with the business community, which are set out in so-called sustainability 
accords
viii
. The policy initiatives for combating climate change are formulated in both the 
administrative accords and the sustainability accords. The following targets are key to the 
policy: (i) a 30% cut in greenhouse gases by 2020 compared with 1990, (ii) an energy 
conservation percentage of 2% per year, and (iii) a share of renewable energy sources of 20% 
in 2020 (VROM 2007). To achieve these policy objectives, public and private parties are 
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collaborating on innovative sustainability projects. An example of such an initiative is the 
Salland Green Gas project (see text box 1). 
 
Text box 1: Green Gas Project 
On 14 January 2009 central government and the Association of Provincial Authorities (IPO) signed the Climate 
and Energy Accord between central government and provinces. By signing the accord the provinces are 
endorsing the importance of the national and European sustainability ambitions. The parties also agree that in 
addition to their statutory task, the provinces will contribute to the achievement of the climate objectives as they 
see fit and if necessary with other public and private partners.  
 
Even before the signing of the Climate and Energy Accord by central government and the IPO, the importance 
of sustainable development had been identified and recognised by the Province of Overijssel, as is expressed for 
instance in the Overijssel Energy Pact Programme. With the energy pact the province is for instance aiming at a 
cut in CO2 of 30% by 2020 compared with 1990 (Province of Overijssel 2008). According to the province, this 
target can be achieved by an intensive and long-term approach, in which partnership arrangements are 
concluded with partners in the policy domain. This approach has two spearheads, that is: (i) energy 
conservation in households and businesses and (ii) sustainable generation of energy. The plans for sustainable 
generation of energy have been formulated by the province in the Bioenergy subprogramme.  
 
The Bioenergy subprogramme is a major component of the Energy Pact for the reduction of CO2 emissions and 
will attempt to achieve 52% of the total CO2 reduction. To achieve this percentage the province is for instance 
making efforts to get the production and supply of biogas and/or green gas to consumers (households and/or 
businesses) off the ground. A critical success factor for the production and supply of both biogas and green gas 
is a regional energy infrastructure. This infrastructure is called a Green Gas Hub. A Green Gas Hub is an 
infrastructure for the production, supply and offtake of Green Gas. Producers of biogas, such as pig farmers and 
market gardeners, supply their biogas to a central plant through a pipe. In this central plant the biogas is 
upgraded to natural gas quality (green gas) and the end product can be fed into the natural gas network.  
 
The ambition for a Green Gas Hub has been embedded in a concrete project by the Province of Overijssel. As 
the Green Gas Hub is being implemented in the Salland area, the project goes by the name of Salland Green 
Gas. Salland Green Gas can rightly be regarded as an innovative project. After all: there are only a few Green 
Gas Hubs in the Netherlands. This means that for both the technologies to be used and the administrative 
organisation, the project must be set up from scratch.  
 
 
The Salland Green Gas project is a concrete example of the efforts of the Province of 
Overijssel to combat climate change. The province has an active role in both the initiation and 
the execution of the project. This role-perception is in keeping with the role pattern for the 
government outlined in the “New energy for the climate” work programme. The work 
programme talks of an initiating role for government so that test beds emerge for the 
application of innovative energy-saving techniques (VROM 2007: 42). It is perfectly 
conceivable that such a role-perception is very much in keeping with policy initiatives to 
combat climate change. At the same time a fundamental question arises in the context of the 
earlier liberalisation wave of the energy sector. The liberalisation did after all have the 
consequence that the government ended up remote from the energy sector. The question arises 
in what way a public interest in the sector can be safeguarded in which intensive involvement 
of the government is important. A solution to this problem appears to be available. The 
national “New energy for the climate” work programme states in advance that there are 
opportunities for public-private partnership (PPP)
ix
. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning & the Environment (VROM) omits any further elaboration of this thinking 
from the report, though it does appear in this paper. It involves an assessment of the 
opportunities that actually exist for PPP below and the way in which a logical and consistent 
appraisal can be made for a form of PPP. This happens by presenting an ex-ante analysis 
framework for legitimate forms of PPP. The focus is on legitimacy because it is generally 
accepted in public administration that public exercise of authority by the government must be 
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legitimate and therefore also the regulation for this exercise of authority (cf. Weber 1922, 
Luhmann 1969, Beetham 1991, Scharpf 1998)
x
. PPP is proposed by the Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning & the Environment (2007) as a solution for realising innovations effectively, 
but the legitimacy of PPP as control of innovation is not answered thereby and must therefore 
be examined on its merits. Below we first give an outline description of how legitimacy is 
approached in public administration. 
 
 
Public administrative legitimacy 
Legitimacy is one of the central concepts in public administration. In the literature this 
concept has therefore had considerable attention from various authors (see for instance: 
Weber 1922, Luhmann 1969, Beetham 1991, Scharpf 1998). For the presentation of an ex-
ante analysis framework for legitimate forms of PPP, David Beetham‟s perspective on 
legitimacy is important. In public administration his body of thought can be construed as one 
of the most detailed perspectives on the legitimacy of public exercise of authority. His 
approach is described in outline below. 
 
In the 1990s David Beetham developed a cross-disciplinary perspective on legitimacy for the 
ex-post evaluation of the legitimacy of public exercise of authority. In his judgment the 
analysis framework can be applied universally (1991: 21). To meet this ambition, David 
Beetham regards legitimacy as a „multi-dimensional‟ concept with three dimensions (1991: 
15-16): 1. legality; 2. shared values; 3. consent. Together they constitute the (cumulative) 
conditions for legitimacy, which can then also be tested empirically (Heldeweg & Sanders 
2011). Table 1 shows a summary of this:  
 
 
Table 1: The three dimensions of legitimacy (Beetham 1991, p. 20, Table 1.1) 
Criteria of Legitimacy Form of Non-legitimate Power 
1. Conformity to rules (legal validity) Illegitimacy (breach of rules) 
2. Justifiability to rules in terms of shared beliefs 
 
Legitimacy deficit (discrepancy between rules and 
supporting beliefs, absence of shared beliefs) 
3. Legitimation through expressed consent Delegitimation (withdrawal of consent) 
 
 
Dimension 1., „legality‟, requires legally valid exercise of authority, as the „law stands‟ – 
including unwritten rules (Beetham, 1991: 64 et seq). Legal rules make (autonomous) social 
regulation possible, thanks in part to alignment of the government to the law – for which read, 
rule of law (Heldeweg & Sanders 2011).  
 
Dimension 2., „shared values‟, requires that the rules by which we must act are also 
intrinsically justified (Beetham, 1991: 69 et seq). They must be based on „normative 
principles‟ that express shared value perceptions about the citizen-government relationship 
(standard setter and standard addressee respectively) and whose justification follows from 
their origin (what is the source?) or their content (why these rules?) (Heldeweg & Sanders 
2011).  
 
Dimension 3., „consent‟, refers to voluntary consent of the subordinate(s) with the political 
exercise of power by the dominant actor (Beetham, 1991: 91 et seq), as by democratic 
mechanisms (Heldeweg & Sanders 2011). 
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The authors of this paper takes the position that David Beetham‟s analysis framework is not 
only applicable to the ex-post assessment of legitimacy of public exercise of authority; his 
three-way structure can also be used as a starting point for the development of an ex-ante 
analysis framework for legitimate forms of PPP in general and be applied to the promotion of 
innovation in particular. For this David Beetham‟s analysis framework is adjusted and 
improved in a number of respects, which leads to a phased plan consisting of five steps, that 
is: (i) characterising of the interest, (ii) choice of the form of regulation, (iii) determination of 
the risks of failure, (iv) denoting PPP type, and finally (v) determination of the legal form. 
 
Step 1: characterising of the interest 
Before the government concludes a PPP, it must first decide whether it has a role in the 
protection of an interest at all (see the distinction between types of interest made above in this 
paper). As we have said, in the report “The safeguarding of public interest” the WRR 
categorises three kinds of interest, that is: (i) individual, (ii) social and (iii) public interests 
(2000: 19). According to the WRR, in the case of social interests it is a matter of interests for 
which protection is desirable for society as a whole (2000: 20). The WRR says that the 
involvement of the government for the promotion of social interests is not necessary per se 
(2000). Many of these social interests are in fact protected without government involvement 
(2000: 20). But, according to the WRR, it is problematic to assume that the quality and the 
accessibility of given social interests for instance are adequately safeguarded without the 
involvement of the government (2000: 20). In those cases the government can concern itself 
with the protection of a social interest on the basis of the conviction that this interest will not 
otherwise be done full justice (WRR 2000: 20). In such situations there is a transformation 
from a social interest into a public interest. This transformation means that the government 
makes the interest the object of its policy (WRR 2000: 21). Which interests are public and in 
what way these interests are expressed in policy goals is the outcome of political 
argumentation and debate. Or, as the WRR puts it: in the case of public interests the what 
question is pre-eminently a political question (2000: 21). The how question (how the 
government must give shape to its final responsibility?) can be answered in many ways (WRR 
2000: 21). According to the WRR, in the case of the how question the key question is always 
whether the government must fulfil its final responsibility on its own or by bringing in private 
parties (2000: 21). The latter happens for instance with PPP. In such a partnership relationship 
between the government and private parties it is however possible to regulate the public 
interest in different ways. An assessment can be made between these forms of regulation. Step 
2 is about this choice. The basic principle here is that innovation in the energy sector, in 
particular where the promotion of sustainable energy generation is concerned, is a public 
interest.  
 
Step 2: choice of the form of coordination 
Where the government has taken the final responsibility for a particular social interest and 
gives its preference for realising this interest in a PPP, the question about the way in which 
this partnership can be coordinated becomes topical. In public administration it is customary 
to make a distinction between three forms of coordination, that is: (i) market, (ii) hierarchy 
and (iii) network (see Thompson 1991: 1)
xi
. These variants are first described in outline 
below, before a link with PPP is made.  
 
The three forms of coordination are regarded in the literature as arenas in which goods and 
services (so policy too) come about through transactions between those concerned (public 
and/or private actors). This implies that the government can make a targeted choice of one of 
these forms of regulation for the method of creating a good or a service. Where the 
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government formulates policy for the realisation of a public interest, it therefore has the 
choice of: (i) market, (i) hierarchical or (iii) network coordination. 
 
First of all there is the market. This type of coordination is not in itself a priori targeted. The 
government can however use market regulation for the realisation of a public interest, in 
particular to secure efficiency. Efficiency is not then the goal, but the outcome. The basic 
thinking behind such an outcome is that both „demanders‟ and „providers‟ of a good or service 
participate in transactions willingly. Together these economic actors form an arena, in which 
the transactions take place. The idea is that the actors make an assessment between all the 
conceivable alternatives on the basis of full information and in their choice pursue the 
optimisation of their own welfare function.  
Hierarchical coordination differs from market coordination in the sense that a hierarchy is in 
itself targeted. In this case an attempt is made to realise a public interest by government 
control. The parties participating in this process are expected to act „in the spirit‟ of the 
objective laid down or to submit to it according to given rules of behaviour. For the 
optimisation of this process it is for instance necessary to define tasks precisely, to grant few 
autonomous powers to contract partners and to structure responsibility relationships top-
down. In contrast to market control, in the hierarchy efficiency is far more a by-product of the 
control, which itself is primarily directed at effective protection of public interests.  
The third arena in which goods and services come about is the network. Just as in the case of 
the hierarchy a network is set up targeted to pursue policy. The network is to be perceived as a 
setting in which the participating autonomous actors try to reach agreement on a strategy to 
achieve a policy goal. It is not the price mechanism that controls the transactions in this case, 
as is the case with the market, nor unilaterally one particular authority, as in a hierarchical 
setting; it is the interaction between the participating parties that leads to agreement on the 
policy strategy. This interaction is necessary because the actors have an equal relationship. 
This equality arises through the specific knowledge or expertise that the parties contribute. 
Parties in a network are equal on the basis of mutual dependence.  
 
As we have indicated, for the safeguarding of a public interest an assessment must be made 
between the three arenas. Guiding in this choice process are the value orientations underlying 
the forms of coordination. These value orientations differ from one type of coordination to 
another.  
The basic thinking of market forces is that economic agents acting rationally on the basis of 
full information (the price of an economic good) make an assessment leading to an optimum 
outcome (efficiency). This outcome is however only possible where there is a perfect market 
(in other words, there can be no question of market failure). Perfect market forces exist where 
the market satisfies two basic principles, that is: (i) it must be „open‟ (transparent) and (ii) 
there must be fair competition. In the practice of public administration these two principles 
are for instance expressed in the European tendering directives.  
In hierarchical coordination it is not so much a matter of competition, but of exercise of public 
authority by the government (or by executives in companies, but this interpretation of 
hierarchical control is not under discussion here). For the exercise of public authority in the 
Dutch doctrine a number of leading legal political values are maintained, which have been 
clustered below in three dimensions, that is (Zijlstra, 2009: 6-8; Heldeweg & Sanders 2011): 
(i) „democracy‟: voice of citizens over government power (with the primacy of general 
people's representation – representation over participation); subsidiarity and decentralisation; 
openness, (ii) „liberal rule of law‟: the separation of state and society, the primacy of civil 
autonomy and alignment of the government to the law – in particular spreading government 
authority, legality, fundamental rights, legal protection (and embedding in the international 
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legal order), (iii) „servient government‟: the government does not exist for itself but for social 
justice and should achieve this effectively and efficiently.  
Networks are described in public administration as more or less stable patterns of 
relationships between mutually dependent actors formed around policy issues or policy 
programmes (Kickert et al, 1997, p. 6). In such an arena policy is the outcome of effective 
communication. For this communication in the first place the basic principle applies that there 
must be general acceptance. This means that all the interests in the network must be 
represented and that then the policy outcome is accepted by all the participants. The second 
basic principle is that there must be reciprocity. This means that the participants act without a 
direct consideration being provided.  
Table 2 shows a summary of the underlying value orientations of the forms of coordination.  
 
 
Table 2: Underlying value orientations of forms of coordination  
Step 2: Choice of the form of coordination 
 Market Hierarchy Network 
Underlying value 
orientations 
Transparency and fair 
competition 
Democracy, liberal rule 
of law and servient 
government 
Reciprocity and general 
acceptance 
 
 
Step 3: determination of the risks of failure 
It is important to realise that any form of coordination in innovative policy projects involves 
the risk of a given type of failure. The step following the choice of an arena to bring about an 
innovative policy project is therefore the indication of these risks. A worthwhile distinction 
that is in line with the different forms of regulation is: (i) market failure, (ii) government 
failure and (iii) network failure. In the practice of public administration these categories of 
failure in innovative policy projects can have all kinds of forms of expression. Given this 
diversity preference has been given to putting a deepening in these forms of expression 
beyond the scope of the paper. Table 3 suffices with giving a number of examples of each 
type of failure. 
 
 
Table 3: Forms of failure 
Step 3: Determination of the risks of failure 
 Market Hierarchy Network 
Forms of failure Missing investments, 
negative external or 
distribution effects 
Supply control and 
bureaucratic inefficiency 
Inclusivity/exclusivity, 
hierarchy within the 
network 
 
 
Step 4: denoting PPP type 
It is important to indicate the failure factors in the previous step because they can be avoided 
by introducing subsets in the three arenas that consist of elements of the other forms of 
regulation. The consequence of combining elements of different forms of regulation is that 
hybrids emerge. PPP must be understood as an example of such a hybrid
xii
. PPP is defined by 
Heldeweg & Sanders as a legally structured partnership between one or more authorities and 
one or more corporate entities governed by private law that focuses on the development and 
execution of a common strategy for the realisation of a policy project (2011)
xiii
. The above 
implies that a PPP is possible in the three alternative forms of coordination. For this reason 
Heldeweg & Sanders distinguish the following types of PPP: „PPP in a market arena‟ or 
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„market PPP‟, „PPP in a network arena‟ or „network PPP‟ and „PPP in a hierarchical arena‟ or 
„authoritative PPP‟. Table 4 gives a summary of the forms of PPP.  
 
 
Table 4: Forms of PPP (Heldeweg & Sanders 2011, Table 1) 
PPP type Goal & Approach (way of working) 
 
Market PPP 
Goal: to put a policy project into effect 
Approach: as exchange, on the basis of separated powers & responsibilities 
- public party lays down – in particular assignment and decisions 
- private party puts into effect – in particular „working & services‟ 
 
Network PPP 
Goal: joint determination of goals and an associated strategy as regards a 
policy project 
Approach: focused on coordination of powers & responsibilities  
- public party lays down 
- private party may participate in the putting into effect 
 
Authoritative PPP 
Goal: authoritative determination (and arranging putting into effect) of a policy 
project 
Approach: on the basis of joint powers & responsibilities 
- joint determination of goals/strategy/decisions (with public authority) 
- putting into effect itself or by others 
 
 
The goal of the market PPP is not this joint strategy, but putting a policy project into effect on 
the basis of (mutually beneficial) exchange against the background of separate public and 
private positions (Smit, 2010). This leads to PPP as bare configuration, as in the construction 
of durable property such as wind farms (Heldeweg & Sanders 2011). The government 
formulates the project and then the phases from building design and building construction 
through to maintenance and/or operation are put out to tender, for example in the form of a 
DBFM(O) contract (Van Ham & Koppenjan 2002).
xiv
  
 
In the „network PPP‟ there is partnership in an association (let‟s say, a „committee‟) with the 
aim of formulating a joint strategy – such as a municipality consulting with retailers about the 
design of a town centre (Heldeweg & Sanders 2011). According to Heldeweg & Sanders, it 
does however remain the case that public and private parties have their own tasks, powers and 
responsibilities, so that implementation of the strategy by formal decisions to this effect 
remains a matter for the government (and it otherwise remains to be seen – possibly in terms 
of competition law –whether and if so what role the private parties concerned play in any 
execution) (2011). 
 
Finally, Heldeweg & Sanders distinguish the „authoritative PPP‟, which not only has 
partnership at strategy formulation level, but its determination, or the taking of (execution) 
decisions to this effect also counts among the powers of the partnership; this PPP goes hand in 
hand with citizen-binding decisions, in short: public authority (Heldeweg & Sanders 2011).  
 
Step 5: determination of the legal form 
Once it has been determined at „step 5‟ which form of PPP is involved, a concrete form of 
organisation can then be laid down. Different arguments play a part in the assessment process 
for a given legal form, which also differ from one situation to another. The participants in a 
legal form may for example attach importance to limitation of liability or to tax transparency. 
In addition to participants, restrictions are also laid down by the authorities – as outcomes of 
multi-level governance, for example through EU rules. By identifying these arguments and 
frameworks it is possible to make the definitive choice for a legal form. 
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Table 5: Summary of legal forms
xv
 
Step 5: Determination of the legal form 
 Market Hierarchy Network 
Legal forms Only contract, joint 
companies ((partnership, 
general partnership, 
limited partnership, 
public company, private 
company, foundation 
and/or (cooperative) 
association)), property 
law arrangements 
(ownership, easements, 
qualitative obligations, 
perpetual clauses, ground 
lease, building and 
planting rights, apartment 
rights) 
Administrative 
committees, provincial 
committees, joint 
regulation 
Optional committees 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
On the basis of the developments in the field of sustainability in the energy sector it has been 
illustrated in this paper that what is regarded as public interest is the outcome of political 
argumentation and debate. This dynamic does not just have an impact on the interests that are 
regarded as public (the what question), but also on the way in which public interests are 
safeguarded (the how question). Different mechanisms are possible for the safeguarding of 
public interests.  
In the field of renewable energy sources (as in the case of the Salland Green Gas project) the 
government is reliant on technological innovations by private parties in the sector. The 
government sees it as its responsibility actually to offer these private parties the space for 
technological innovations. This is possible by concluding PPP links with parties in the policy 
domain.  
This paper shows that different types of PPP are possible for the safeguarding of public 
interests and that a variety of legal forms go with these types. This variety raises the question 
of how a legitimate form of PPP can be selected in a logical and consistent way. In this paper 
an ex-ante analysis framework has been presented for this. This analysis framework has been 
presented as the following phased plan: 
1. characterising of the interest; 
2. choice of the form of regulation; 
3. determination of the risks of failure; 
4. denoting PPP type; 
5. determination of the legal form. 
The above analysis framework is being applied in the Salland Green Gas project. Because this 
process is currently ongoing, it is not yet possible to report on the outcome of the ex-ante 
analysis framework. 
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 Maurits Sanders is senior lecturer in public administration at the Saxion and a Ph-D-student at the University of 
Twente; Michiel Heldeweg is professor of Public Governance Law at the aforementioned University. Both are 
involved in the Smart rules & regimes program of the LEGS-department at that same University. 
ii
 Thompson distinguishes three forms of regulation, that is: (i) market, (ii) hierarchy and (iii) network (see 
Thompson et al, 1991). 
iii
 The shares of these companies are sometimes in government hands and sometimes not (any more). 
iv
 The concept of public interest is studied in various scientific disciplines, which has led to different definitions 
of the term. Van Genugten categorises these different meanings in two types of approach, that is: (i) economic 
approach to public interests and (ii) public interests in the politico-administrative reality approach (2008, p. 5). 
Because of the administrative-legal approach of this paper and the casuistry, a definition of public interests from 
the politico-administrative approach has been chosen. The WRR approach falls into the politico-administrative 
approach (Van Genugten 2008, p. 5). Alternative definitions can also be found in the politico-administrative 
approach, which usually cover the same overtone. An example of this is the Socio-Economic Council (SER) 
which, in the design advice “Public interest requires customisation in market mechanism”, describes this type of 
interest as interests whose protection is desirable for society as a whole and that politics is concerned about for 
this reason (2010). In the opinion of the authors, this description is an excellent conceptual starting point in this 
paper in view of the authoritativeness of the WRR definition. 
v
 For the realisation of public interests the government then formulates policy. Because the term policy is used 
regularly in this paper, a conceptual definition is important. A topical and frequently quoted definition is given 
by Hoppe et al (2004). His definition is: policy is a politically confirmed plan for the approach, preferably a 
solution, to a social problem (Hoppe et al, 2004, p. 14). 
vi
 See the Independent Grid Management Act. 
vii
 The climate accord “Working together on a climate-proof and sustainable Netherlands”, which was signed by 
central government and the Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG) on 12 November 2007, is an example of 
such an administrative accord. These climate accords also exist between the Association of Regional Water 
Authorities and central government and the provinces and central government.  
viii
 An example of a sustainability accord is the accord signed by the Cabinet and the business community (MKB-
Nederland, VNO-NCW and LTO Nederland) on 1 November 2007. 
ix
 The European Commission is also seeking its salvation in PPP, witness some major initiatives, especially 
where innovation is important. An example of this is the Green Cars initiative. 
x
 Discussion of this basic principle falls outside the scope of this paper. 
xi
 The forms of coordination can be approached in two ways. First, as spontaneous coordination, in which no 
direction is given, but emerges in the context. For example, a group of people having intensive dealings with 
each other can have the characteristics of a network. Second, the forms of coordination can be approached as 
chosen coordination. This means that before the production of a good or a service an arena is chosen. For 
example, the government has the choice of leaving policy projects to the market, organising them hierarchically 
or letting them come about in a network context. In this paper the forms of coordination are approached as 
chosen forms of coordination.  
xii
 Committees for interactive policy-forming are another example of a hybrid form. 
xiii
 The Heldeweg & Sanders definition is in part based on the definition used by Bregman (2005). 
xiv
 Design, Build, Finance, Maintain (and Operate) (Van Ham & Koppenjan 2002) – with interaction (cf. the 
„competition-oriented dialogue‟), but not as independent goal (as with network and authority PPP).  
xv
 This summary is partly based on Bregman (2005). 
